While there is evidence that politics matter for international cooperation, the impact on economic integration of the quality of institutions has been given short shrift in the previous literature. I argue that the quality of institutions-control of corruption and enforcement of the rule of law, in particular-raises the quantity and the quality of information available to potential member states during the bargain phase of a trade agreement. In turn, this inflow of information reduces the negotiation period of an agreement and in doing so, dampens the transaction costs associated with it. As a result, countries with good institutions are more likely to form trade agreements. Using original data on both the formation of trade agreements and the duration of negotiations, I quantitatively test this argument. The results strongly support the claim that the quality of institutions is a crucial driver in explaining the recent wave of regionalism.
Introduction
How do domestic institutions impact economic cooperation among countries? The previous literature has convincingly demonstrated that democratic regimes are more likely to engage in economic cooperation than autocratic regimes (Leeds, 1999; Mar-1 tin, 2000; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Milner, 2010; McGillivray and Smith, 2008) . The causal mechanism proposed by these studies boils down to electoral accountability. On the one hand, democratic leaders use international cooperation to signal to voters their willingness to implement welfareenhancing policies in opposition to rent-seeking policies. In doing so, leaders increase the probability of remaining in office (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; Mansfield and Milner, 2010) . On the other hand, democracies are able to establish credibility of commitments, which is necessary in international cooperation due to incomplete information about other countries' preferences. Indeed democratic leaders can be sanctioned and voted out of office if they renege on their promise to cooperate (Leeds, 1999; Martin, 2000; McGillivray and Smith, 2008) .
In exploring the impact of domestic institutions on economic cooperation among countries, my contribution is two-fold. First, I show that the decision to cooperate with other countries depends crucially on the cost of reaching an agreement. In other words, while, with few important exceptions (Bearce, 2002; Simonelli, 2007) , previous studies focus mainly on the enforcement phase of cooperation, I emphasize the role of the negotiation phase. Second, I take into account the quality of institutions in explaining why some countries cooperate more than others in the international economic system. By the quality of institutions, I mean the way in which the rules of the game work at the domestic level, or what Rodrik (2003: 32) defines as 'market-creating institutions'. Specifically, I focus on the control of corruption 2 and the enforcement of the rule of law. Although the number of democratic regimes and thus the use of proper constitutional devices to make politicians accountable to citizens have spread in many parts of the world, there is still a wide variation in the quality of institutions (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003: 445) . In this paper I show that such a variation is responsible for explaining the formation of a large number of economic agreements in the past two decades.
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My argument is firmly grounded in the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature. In a nutshell, I posit that high levels of control of corruption and enforcement of the rule of law increase the amount of information available among states. In turn, this large quality and quantity of information decreases the length of the negotiation of an agreement and in doing so, the transaction costs associated with it. As a result of this decline in bargaining costs, countries with a high quality of institutions are more likely to engage in economic cooperation. I test this argument, looking at the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The results strongly support my hypotheses. Countries with a high quality of in-stitutions form more agreements in a shorter period of time than countries with a low quality of institutions. Both high levels of control of corruption and the rule of law perform similarly. In addition, the quality of institutions matters even when controlling for the type of regime. In fact, the quality of institutions outperforms indicators capturing how democratic a country is. The results are robust to a large variety of checks and, importantly, are not hampered by selection bias.
The implications of these results are important. If the quality of institutions matter, previous studies have underestimated the advantage of having good institutions overemphasizing the presence of the sole (though relevant) electoral device. Mattli (1999) argues that economic integration arises because (usually big) companies demand large markets to achieve economy of scale in production.
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I show that countries that have better institutions are more likely to create such large markets by forming trade agreements. For instance, companies placed in highly transparent countries have a comparative advantage in terms of market access over companies placed in poorly transparent countries. In sum, next to the well known effect on economic growth (Rodrik, 2003) , my findings imply that the quality of institutions also has an indirect impact on economic competitiveness across countries. This paper is structured as follows. The following section develops the theory upon which this study is built and derives four testable hypotheses. The third section describes the research design. The fourth section shows the empirical results of the econometric analysis. The fifth section controls for the robustness of the results.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Theory and Hypotheses
From a legal point of view, a PTA, like every international agreement, is a lawfully binding contract between at least two countries. Cooperative agreements are formed by states via bargaining (Gilligan 2004; Fearon, 1994; . In Fearon's words (1998: 270) , 'problems of international cooperation typically involve first a bargaining problem (akin to various coordination games [. . . ] ).' Bargaining, as every coordination game, is mined by uncertainty and lack of information. As such, bargaining generates transaction costs. As Gilligan posits, unlike economics, these transactions do not involve the exchange of one good or service for another in international relations. Rather, such a transaction is 'a specific agreed-upon change in the policies in one country in exchange for specific changes in policies in another country' (Gilligan, 2011: 14) . Previous studies emphasize the role of transaction costs in international cooperation (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1987; Keohane, 1989; Mattli 1999 , Moravcsik, 1999 . In particular, Keohane (1989: 166) argues that 'if transaction costs are extremely high it will not be feasible to build international institutions.'
The formation of a PTA is a complex procedure that requires member countries to change trade and trade-related policies. As such, a PTA negotiation is usually carried out over a considerable period of time. Thus, the transaction costs are non-5 trivial. Figure 1 shows the duration of negotiations of all the North-South PTAs signed post-1990 by world region. The actual negotiation of these PTAs lasts on average not less than three years (with the exception of the EU Central Asia region). Negotiations are characterized by several rounds in which policymakers of both countries meet and discuss the provisions to include in the agreement. During these rounds, which mirror WTO rounds, negotiators seek a compromise between several trade and trade-related issues that characterize the last wave of PTAs. If transaction costs are large, how can they be reduced? The NIE literature stresses the importance of good institutions in reducing transaction costs among individuals (Coase, 1960; North, 1990; Williamson, 1979) . I extend the insights of the NIE literature to international cooperation among countries. Specifically, I advance the argument that countries with good institutions have access to more and better information than countries with bad institutions. In turn, this increase in the quality and quantity of information available to countries shortens the negotiation period. As the length of negotiations shrinks, transaction costs, which are an increasing function of the bargaining duration (Williamson, 1998) , are reduced too.
When PTAs are (or are perceived) as being relatively cheap to bargain due to their low transaction costs, countries are more likely to embark on negotiations in the first place and therefore to form PTAs.
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The quality of institutions is a broad, multi-dimensional concept. I focus on two specific dimensions: the control of corruption and enforcement of the rule of law.
First, how does the control of corruption reduce the period of negotiation of a PTA? Examples abound. A US chief economist involved in the Chile-US negotiations claims that reaching an agreement with Chile was relatively easy due to the transparency of Chilean institutions. Similarly, a Chilean diplomat who also took part in the negotiations acknowledges that bargaining with the US was a particularly fast process compared to bargaining with other countries that negotiated PTAs with Chile. According to this high-ranking Chilean diplomat, the fast negotiation benefitted from the transparent bargaining strategy carried out by the US. In the words of this diplomat, Chilean negotiators could easily detect US preferences and goals from the first round of negotiations.
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The importance of transparent institutions during negotiations is familiar to practitioners. In commenting on the main lessons learned from the Chile-US PTA negotiation, Osvaldo Rosales, Director General for International Economic Relations, praises the role of institutions-a low level of corruption and an independent judicial system, in particular (2003: 6) . In explaining the success of such negotiation Rosales (2003: 5) claims that 'macroeconomic stability is not sufficient, if they do not go with solid institutions that reinforce the stability of incentives and the transparency of public decisions.' To be sure, there were difficulties in negotiating As a consequence of Ecuador's oil bill, the US suspended negotiations with Ecuador. In justifying the decision of the US administration to cancel freetrade negotiations with Ecuador, Moorjani said that countries must 'obey the rule of law with respect to foreign investors' if they want to be a free-trade partner of the US.
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The de facto nationalization of the US oil company does not come as a surprise in a country like Ecuador. Indeed, according to both the World Bank and ICRG indicators, in terms of enforcement of the rule of law, Ecuador scores substantively lower than its neighbouring countries such as Colombia and Peru, which both signed a PTA with the US.
In sum, the theoretical framework that I developed suggests that institutional qualitycontrol of corruption and enforcement of the rule of law, in particular-dampens transaction costs by increasing information among states. When the bargaining process is less costly and unstable for each state, the likelihood of forming a PTA increases. Note: my argument is dyadic, i.e. the quality of institutions of both countries needs to be high to trigger the causal mechanism that I suggest.
Hypotheses
With these insights, I will test the following two hypotheses related to the probability of signing a PTA: HP1: A joint high level of control of corruption in dyads of countries is expected to increase the probability of forming a preferential trade agreement. 
Research Design
For testing these hypotheses, I use the two models described in Equation 1. (2) where h ij,t (F ormation) and h ij,t (Duration) are the hazard rates for two countries i and j at time t and h0 ij,t is the baseline hazard. Quality of Institutions, which included both Control of Corruption and Rule of Law, is the main explanatory variable. Moreover, X ij,t−1 is a vector of control variables, β 1 and β 2 are the coefficients, and ij,t is the error term. Below I discuss the dependent variables, main explanatory variables, and control variables in detail.
Dependent Variable
I use two dependent variables. The first dependent variable measures the hazard rate of forming a PTA (to test HP1 and HP2). To arrive at that, for each dyad I coded whether it signed a trade agreement in a specific year. Specifically, PTA Formation equals 1 if two countries join the same PTA in given year t, 0 otherwise. This allows me to calculate the time in terms of years that a dyad goes without signing an agreement, that is, the hazard rate. In line with previous studies (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008) , I opted for the year of signature rather than the year of entry into force of an agreement. Moreover, I
included both multilateral trade agreements, e.g. the EU, and bilateral trade agreements, e.g. the US-Chile agreement. I analyse only the first PTA. Hence, pairs of countries drop from the dataset after forming a trade bloc. Finally, since the dependent variable assumes a value other than 0 only in the years in which the PTA is formed, the formation of a PTA is a typical rare event. What is worse is that missing data are not random, but are concentrated among poor, small countries (around 90%).
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To avoid dealing with non-random missing data, I focus only on North-South PTAs for which I was able to have complete data. Specifically, I explain negotiations of every bilateral agreement signed by Australia, the EU, EFTA, Japan, New Zealand, and the US with developing countries. Focussing on only North-South bilateral agreements has also another important advantage. These agreements are fairly similar one to another in terms of design and in terms of depth. For instance, they have a similar number of pages, similar issue-chapters, and similar provisions. These variables range between 0 (low quality of institutions) to 6 (high quality of institutions). Note: the correlation between Control of Corruption and Rule of Law is quite high, i.e. .85. Thus I estimate separately these variables to avoid the multicollinearity problem. Finally, to capture the joint-effect argument, I use the lower level of the quality of institutions in a dyad (Reuveny and Li, 2003) .
Quality of Institutions

Control Variables
Since other factors are likely to influence the chances of two countries' signing a PTA, I include a series of characteristics of the dyad under analysis and the context in which a dyad considers concluding an agreement. Doing so is vital to avoid overestimating the effect of the main explanatory variables, as parallel policy choices may be a result of correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that are common to various dyads. In line with previous studies in the field, I hence include several economic, geographical, and political control variables in my model to explain the formation of PTAs. Conversely, I include only a handful of these control variables to explain duration. Such a parsimonious approach is necessary due to the low number of observations. Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. Moreover, in the case of monadic variables, e.g. GDP and GDPpc, I use always the smaller of the two countries' values.
Concerning the variables capturing the economic condition in which the pair considers signing an agreement, I control for the amount of trade between the two countries, as an increase in trade may boost the probability of the two forming a preferential trade agreement (Trade). Large trade flows are likely to be accompanied with investments that are relation-specific, making traders dependent on access to each other's markets. They then may ask for a PTA to lock-in the existing situation and forestall protectionist trade policies by either side.
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Trade may also matter as the positive welfare effects of a preferential trade agreement should be larger for countries with large trade flows already existing before conclusion of the agreement (Bhagwati, 1993) . Furthermore, it can be hypothesized that signing an agreement between two economies of a relatively equal size should be easier than signing one between a large and a small economy. Among the reasons to expect such an effect is that a small country may fear becoming overly dependent on a large country and that for a large country the economic benefits of an agreement with a small country are likely to be minor. The welfare gains from an agreement may also increase as the parties to an agreement become more similar in economic size (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . The measure that I use for this variable is the absolute difference in GDP between the two countries (SIM).
I also include a measure of the size of the economy of the two countries to capture the idea that the larger the countries participating in a preferential trade agreement, the larger the economic gains. As Baier and Bergstrand (2004: 45) argue, a preferential agreement between two large economies increases the volume of trade in more varieties than one between two small economies. In addition, a more sizeable increase in trade among two large countries causes a larger net expansion of demand and hence a larger rise in real income. I capture this idea by including GDP (GDP).
A further factor that potentially influences the likelihood of an agreement between a pair of countries is their level of development. The more developed are the two countries, the easier it is that they should find concluding an agreement. Two reasons support this expectation. First, a country with a highly developed economy is less dependent on tariff revenues. Second, a developed country is in a better position to compensate societal groups that face adjustment costs arising from trade liberalization (Ruggie, 1982) . The variable that captures this argument is the GDP per capita (GDP Per Capita). The final economic variable that I include is economic growth, as a downturn in the business cycle in at least one of the two countries may increase the probability of a preferential trade agreement being formed (GDP Growth).
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Two control variables capture domestic and international political conditions. At the international level, it is quite straightforward to assume that military allies should be more likely to sign an agreement than other pairs of countries (Alliance). At the domestic level, previous research has shown that democratic pairs of countries tend to sign more PTAs than non-democratic or mixed pairs (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002) Moreover, I include three variables that capture the geographic position of the two countries. For one, neighbouring countries can be expected to have a higher probability of signing an agreement. Not only are there, on average, closer economic links between adjacent countries, but also the political links tend to be stronger.
Following this reasoning, I expect countries that share a common border to be more likely to sign an agreement (Contiguity). In addition, since trade costs increase with distance, geographically proximate countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement (Krugman, 1991; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003) . This last variable is labeled Trade Dispute Third Party.
I also use three proxies to capture the cultural distance between the two countries, as culturally similar countries may find it easier to negotiate an international agreement. These proxies are common language, same religion, and common colonial heritage (Language, Religion, and Colony). Finally, I include a variable counting the number of PTAs formed by each country in a dyad up to t − 1. This variable captures the diffusion of PTAs, labelled Diffusion (Manger, 2005) . Univariate summary statistics and data sources for all of these variables are available in Table 4 . 14 Since this is a cross-section analysis, I use the value reported in 1990 for time-varying covariates. In doing so, I should minimize the concern of endogeneity, i.e. negotiations might affect the quality of institutions.
The analysis covers 18 years from 1990 to 2007. As Clarke has forcefully shown, including control variables to deal with such a major shift may increase rather than reduce the omitted variable bias (Clarke, 2005) . I thus follow his recommendation of substituting research design for control variables by limiting the dataset to the post-Cold War period.
To estimate Model 1 and Model 2, I use a Cox Proportional Hazard Model. Event history models have three main advantages in such analyses. First, they incorporate the problem of left and right censoring that this project will have to take into account. Second, they allow a proper analysis of repeated spells, i.e. transition several times from one (or two, or three, etc.) and then back to zero again, using as an explanatory variable the number of previous transitions from zero to one (or two, or three, etc.) that dyads have experienced (Beck, 2008: 288) . Third, they allow a more appropriate treatment of time-varying predictors in the models compared to the other regressions.
Among several history models, I choose the Cox Proportional Hazard model (1972) because of its elegance and computational feasibility. Since there are no a priori reasons to make any reasonable assumptions about the shape of the hazard in the case of the formation of PTAs, this latter feature of the Cox model is particularly welcome in this study.
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Finally, due to panel heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, tests of statistical significance for the parameter estimates may be biased. In some recent research on the statistical analysis of time-series cross-section data with a binary dependent variable, Beck and Tucker (1996) (Table   3) confirming that democratic regimes are more likely to cooperate than autocratic ones. However, Figure 4 shows that the effect of Democracy on the probability of forming a PTA is substantively lower than the effect of the quality of institutions. 
Duration of Negotiations
In the previous section I provided strong evidence in supporting the argument that the quality of institutions matter when it comes to predict the formation of PTAs.
Quality of institutions might impact upon the formation of PTAs in several ways.
In presenting my theoretical framework I claimed that the main channel is the reduction of the negotiation period (and of the transaction costs associated with it).
Is there any evidence that this is the case? Table 4 The results of the second set of variables are likely to be driven by the fact that I lose more than 20% of the observations. Since the number of observations is low, the model is sensitive to this substantial change of the sample. Table 4 estimate the main models using splines for time-varying covariates (Keele, 2010) .
Note: since models with splines are computationally very intensive to run (Keele, 2010: 196) , I include only three variables as also suggested by Achen (2005). Table 6 and Table 7 show results for the WGI indicators. All previous findings are confirmed.
For the ICRG indicators results, which are also very similar to the ones reported above, are available upon request. 
Conclusion
In a oft-cited article published in the Journal of Economic Growth Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004: 135) stress that 'institutions rule. . . in economic development' and that 'the quality of institutions 'trumps' everything else', e.g. trade and geography. The importance of economic and geographical variables in the formation of PTAs does not lead to the same unequivocal conclusions. However, in this paper I do show that institutions do matter in regional integration. Indeed, the results support the argument that the quality of institutions plays an important role in regional integration. In particular, the control of corruption and the rule of law decrease the period of PTA negotiation and increase the probability of forming a PTA. These findings have two important policy implications.
First, my results imply that there are substantial gains to be made from improving the quality of institutions. These gains are well established in terms of economic growth, as indeed (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004) shows, but also relevant in relation to economic cooperation. If the demand arises for regional integration in order to reap benefits from economies of scale and to reduce transaction costs, as Mattli (1999) posits, governments that have high quality institutions are more likely to satisfy this demand and, in turn, improve their economic performance.
Conversely, governments with low quality institutions are not able to capitalize on the opportunity that regional integration presents and, in turn, risk lagging even further behind in terms of economic growth. In sum, endogenous institution building is crucial for cooperation.
Second, something must be said about timing. This paper suggests that it is desirable for countries to undertake policy innovations that eventually result in an improvement of their institutions first, and then carry out a process of economic integration. Despite evidence that regional integration leads to policy convergence (Risse, Caporaso and Green, 2001) , I argue that the formation of a PTA is easier, smoother, and less costly if some kind of convergence is reached before starting the bargaining process rather than after having joined a PTA. The classic example that fits into this pattern is the experience of the EU, which is constituted by fairly homo-geneous high-quality-institution member countries. Conversely, the lack of similar institutional quality-between Singapore and Myammar, for instance-may explain the difficulties in the integration process experienced by the ASEAN Pact since its foundation in the 1960s.
To conclude, the quality of institutions might affect the formation of PTAs in another way that I did not explore in this paper. The EU was reluctant to include safeguards due to difficulties in monitoring ACP countries, the majority of which have rather opaque domestic systems. Put simply, due to this lack of transparency, the EU could not determine whether these safeguards would be used to defend infant industries in accordance with the rationale of their provision, or would constitute purely free-rider behavior. Taking into account these issues, future studies could explore the impact of the quality of institutions on the design of PTAs in general, and on their degree of flexibility in particular. 2 For another attempt to distinguish among democracies, see Rickard (2010) .
3 PTAs are international arrangements under which each member grants special market access to all the other members' products (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1999) . PTAs include free trade areas (e.g. the ASEAN Pact), common markets (e.g. NAFTA), customs unions (e.g. CARICOM), and economic monetary unions (e.g. the EU). I explain the formation of all these types of preferential instruments without distinction between bilateral and regional agreements.
4 The economy of scale implies that an increase in production lowers the average cost of output per unit.
5 These meetings occur also after the signature of the trade agreement. Therefore countries anticipate that problems which arise in the negotiation phase of a PTA will also materialize during its enforcement phase. I do not further expand this argument since this paper does not deal with the enforcement phase of an agreement and does not develop any predictions related to this phase. 
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13 The results do not change when using other data sources, such as the Polity IV score.
14 For the EU and EFTA I use the minimal value of each covariate among member countries.
The results do not change when using the mean, the median, or the maximum value.
15 I always report coefficients and not hazard ratios. 
